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When a boat springs a leak far from shore, it is customary 
for  all  hands  to  man  the  pumps—be  they  friends  or 
enemies, passengers or crew. Every individual’s survival 
depends on the actions of his or her compatriots. So it is 
with the global economy today.
Nearly  everyone  recognizes  the  interdependence 
of  all  nations  and  all  regions.  Strangely,  though,  one 
group with an enormous stake—energy-exporting coun-
tries—has been content with watching, saying nothing 
and doing nothing. It has, as it were, let others man the 
pumps.
Yet energy-exporting countries have more at risk than 
any other participant in the world economy. Everyone 
knows that global economic growth will slow if the euro 
crisis plunges Europe into deep recession. Many believe 
this slowdown would be worse than the Great Recession. 
Oil and natural gas prices would surely plummet if these 
forecasts proved correct.
Between July and December 2008, crude oil prices 
dropped from $145 per barrel to $32 per barrel. Between 
2008 and 2009, natural gas prices fell 30 percent in 
the European Union. The 2008–09 price declines were 
arrested due to the combined efforts of the Organization 
of Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC) and central 
banks. Oil-exporting countries cut production. At the 
same time, commercial banks purchased large volumes 
of  oil  as  investments,  using  money  supplied  by  the 
US Treasury  and  Federal  Reserve.  The  banks’  actions 
removed  more  oil  from  the  market  than  OPEC  and 
earned those firms good returns.
Should a serious global recession occur, the global 
oil  and  gas  price  collapse  in  2012  would  likely  be 
larger than the 2008–09 decline for two reasons. First, 
oil-exporting  countries  would  be  alone.  The  financial 
reform mandated by Senator Chris Dodd (D-CT) and 
Representative  Barney  Frank  (D-MA)  would  prevent 
banks  from  intervening.  Furthermore,  central  banks 
would  likely  look  askance  at  the  idea  of  advancing 
monies  to  help  commercial  institutions  accumulate 
commodity inventories.
Oil and gas exporters can expect a 
very large, sustained drop in their 
exports’ consumption if the euro 
crisis progresses to collapse.
The price decline would also likely be greater because 
global oil and natural gas use would not rebound quickly 
in  what  would  be  a  less-vigorous  economic  recovery. 
Oil and gas consumption fell briefly in 2009 and then 
surged ahead, thanks to the United States and China 
adopting Keynesian stimulus programs. China’s effort 
was particularly noteworthy and all commodity markets 
felt its impact. This kind of support would probably not 
be forthcoming in 2012.N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 2 2   D e c e m b e r   2 0 1 1
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Next year will be, as they say, different from 2009. 
Europe  is  pursuing  an  aggressive  austerity  program, 
which  will  plunge  many  of  its  countries  into  serious 
recession. The United States is also following a less stim-
ulative economic program as a result of the impasse in 
Congress. Growth in China is moderating as well.
…energy-exporting countries should be 
working feverishly with the IMF and the 
European Union. They, along with China 
and other large holders of foreign exchange 
reserves, should lend to the IMF to help it 
construct an emergency lending facility….
Oil and gas exporters can expect a very large, sustained 
drop  in  their  exports’  consumption  if  the  euro  crisis 
progresses to collapse. They can also anticipate revenue 
plunging as it did between 2008 and 2009. According to 
the US Department of Energy, OPEC income fell from 
nearly $1 trillion in 2008 to $600 billion in 2009. No 
doubt Russia’s export profits decreased as well.
Energy-exporting countries would likely experience 
greater losses in 2012 should Europe fail. These losses 
would come at a critical time for several Middle Eastern 
countries. The Arab Spring has swept away one govern-
ment after another in the region. The regimes still in 
power have used oil revenues to buy off their citizens. 
An oil and gas price collapse would cut off the income 
required to fund these policies. 
Given these circumstances, energy-exporting coun-
tries should be working feverishly with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Union. They, 
along  with  China  and  other  large  holders  of  foreign 
exchange reserves, should lend to the IMF to help it 
construct an emergency lending facility with capacity 
of more than €1 trillion. The fund, administered by the 
IMF, would be used to buy bonds issued by Greece, Italy, 
Spain, Portugal, and Ireland. The goal should be to bring 
interest rates on long-term bonds down to 3 percent. 
Simultaneously, efforts should be redoubled to fix the 
economic problems in the troubled nations and restore 
balance to their budgets. This will be practicable only if 
interest rates are much lower.
Lower interest rates—a seemingly impossible target 
at this point—are easily achievable if energy-exporting 
countries help finance the purchase of a large number 
of bonds. Of course, their leaders will assert they have 
problems as well and thus do nothing. Such a response 
would be a mistake, as these nations likely would suffer 
even greater ravages and deprivations as a result. Officials 
from energy-exporting countries need to think of the 
sinking boat and join in the bailout effort. They might 
also recall the advice of the American patriot Benjamin 
Franklin, who once warned, “We must all hang together, 
or assuredly we shall all hang separately.”
Some in Europe, the United States, and Asia may 
read  this  commentary  and  conclude  that  a  possible 
energy  price  collapse  strengthens  the  argument  for 
letting the euro fail, thinking lower prices would boost 
global  growth.  This  view  is  wrong.  An  energy  price 
collapse would increase disruptions in energy-exporting 
countries,  promote  economic  ills  in  some  consuming 
nations, such as Canada, and almost certainly start yet a 
third, even more violent, economic cycle.
It is time for everyone to man the pumps.
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